| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/platform: Create persistent IRQ handlers
The vfio-platform SET_IRQS ioctl currently allows loopback triggering of
an interrupt before a signaling eventfd has been configured by the user,
which thereby allows a NULL pointer dereference.
Rather than register the IRQ relative to a valid trigger, register all
IRQs in a disabled state in the device open path. This allows mask
operations on the IRQ to nest within the overall enable state governed
by a valid eventfd signal. This decouples @masked, protected by the
@locked spinlock from @trigger, protected via the @igate mutex.
In doing so, it's guaranteed that changes to @trigger cannot race the
IRQ handlers because the IRQ handler is synchronously disabled before
modifying the trigger, and loopback triggering of the IRQ via ioctl is
safe due to serialization with trigger changes via igate.
For compatibility, request_irq() failures are maintained to be local to
the SET_IRQS ioctl rather than a fatal error in the open device path.
This allows, for example, a userspace driver with polling mode support
to continue to work regardless of moving the request_irq() call site.
This necessarily blocks all SET_IRQS access to the failed index. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: cadence-qspi: remove system-wide suspend helper calls from runtime PM hooks
The ->runtime_suspend() and ->runtime_resume() callbacks are not
expected to call spi_controller_suspend() and spi_controller_resume().
Remove calls to those in the cadence-qspi driver.
Those helpers have two roles currently:
- They stop/start the queue, including dealing with the kworker.
- They toggle the SPI controller SPI_CONTROLLER_SUSPENDED flag. It
requires acquiring ctlr->bus_lock_mutex.
Step one is irrelevant because cadence-qspi is not queued. Step two
however has two implications:
- A deadlock occurs, because ->runtime_resume() is called in a context
where the lock is already taken (in the ->exec_op() callback, where
the usage count is incremented).
- It would disallow all operations once the device is auto-suspended.
Here is a brief call tree highlighting the mutex deadlock:
spi_mem_exec_op()
...
spi_mem_access_start()
mutex_lock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex)
cqspi_exec_mem_op()
pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
cqspi_resume()
spi_controller_resume()
mutex_lock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex)
...
spi_mem_access_end()
mutex_unlock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex)
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: veth: clear GRO when clearing XDP even when down
veth sets NETIF_F_GRO automatically when XDP is enabled,
because both features use the same NAPI machinery.
The logic to clear NETIF_F_GRO sits in veth_disable_xdp() which
is called both on ndo_stop and when XDP is turned off.
To avoid the flag from being cleared when the device is brought
down, the clearing is skipped when IFF_UP is not set.
Bringing the device down should indeed not modify its features.
Unfortunately, this means that clearing is also skipped when
XDP is disabled _while_ the device is down. And there's nothing
on the open path to bring the device features back into sync.
IOW if user enables XDP, disables it and then brings the device
up we'll end up with a stray GRO flag set but no NAPI instances.
We don't depend on the GRO flag on the datapath, so the datapath
won't crash. We will crash (or hang), however, next time features
are sync'ed (either by user via ethtool or peer changing its config).
The GRO flag will go away, and veth will try to disable the NAPIs.
But the open path never created them since XDP was off, the GRO flag
was a stray. If NAPI was initialized before we'll hang in napi_disable().
If it never was we'll crash trying to stop uninitialized hrtimer.
Move the GRO flag updates to the XDP enable / disable paths,
instead of mixing them with the ndo_open / ndo_close paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Prevent potential buffer overflow in map_hw_resources
Adds a check in the map_hw_resources function to prevent a potential
buffer overflow. The function was accessing arrays using an index that
could potentially be greater than the size of the arrays, leading to a
buffer overflow.
Adds a check to ensure that the index is within the bounds of the
arrays. If the index is out of bounds, an error message is printed and
break it will continue execution with just ignoring extra data early to
prevent the buffer overflow.
Reported by smatch:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_wrapper.c:79 map_hw_resources() error: buffer overflow 'dml2->v20.scratch.dml_to_dc_pipe_mapping.disp_cfg_to_stream_id' 6 <= 7
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_wrapper.c:81 map_hw_resources() error: buffer overflow 'dml2->v20.scratch.dml_to_dc_pipe_mapping.disp_cfg_to_plane_id' 6 <= 7 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: perf: ctr_get_width function for legacy is not defined
With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n
linux kernel crashes when you try perf record:
$ perf record ls
[ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 46.750199] Oops [#1]
[ 46.750342] Modules linked in:
[ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2
[ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 46.751184] epc : 0x0
[ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e
[ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0
[ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0
[ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930
[ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000
[ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004
[ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2
[ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000
[ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078
[ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001
[ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30
[ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c
[ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec.
[ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled
[ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4
This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not
defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage.
Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gtp: fix use-after-free and null-ptr-deref in gtp_newlink()
The gtp_link_ops operations structure for the subsystem must be
registered after registering the gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure.
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug:
[ 1010.702740] gtp: GTP module unloaded
[ 1010.715877] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 1010.715888] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
[ 1010.715895] CPU: 1 PID: 128616 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-std-def-alt1 #1
[ 1010.715899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014
[ 1010.715908] RIP: 0010:gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp]
[ 1010.715915] Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 41 04 00 00 48 8b bb d8 05 00 00 e8 ed f6 ff ff 48 89 c2 48 89 c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 04 00 00 4c 89 e2 4c 8b 6d 00 48 b8 00 00 00
[ 1010.715920] RSP: 0018:ffff888020fbf180 EFLAGS: 00010203
[ 1010.715929] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800399c000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1010.715933] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff84805280 RDI: 0000000000000282
[ 1010.715938] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1010.715942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88800399cc80
[ 1010.715947] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000400
[ 1010.715953] FS: 00007fd1509ab5c0(0000) GS:ffff88805b300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1010.715958] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1010.715962] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001c07a000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
[ 1010.715968] PKRU: 55555554
[ 1010.715972] Call Trace:
[ 1010.715985] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f
[ 1010.715995] ? die_addr+0x43/0x70
[ 1010.716002] ? exc_general_protection+0x199/0x2f0
[ 1010.716016] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x1e/0x30
[ 1010.716026] ? gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp]
[ 1010.716034] ? gtp_net_exit+0x150/0x150 [gtp]
[ 1010.716042] __rtnl_newlink+0x1063/0x1700
[ 1010.716051] ? rtnl_setlink+0x3c0/0x3c0
[ 1010.716063] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xc0/0x1f0
[ 1010.716070] ? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0
[ 1010.716076] ? __kernel_text_address+0x56/0xa0
[ 1010.716084] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5a/0xa0
[ 1010.716091] ? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x30/0x30
[ 1010.716098] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0
[ 1010.716106] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xd0
[ 1010.716113] ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x170/0x170
[ 1010.716121] ? __lock_acquire+0x15c5/0x5380
[ 1010.716139] ? mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0
[ 1010.716148] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x35f/0x3c0
[ 1010.716155] ? __rtnl_newlink+0x1700/0x1700
[ 1010.716160] rtnl_newlink+0x69/0xa0
[ 1010.716166] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43b/0xc50
[ 1010.716172] ? rtnl_fdb_dump+0x9f0/0x9f0
[ 1010.716179] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560
[ 1010.716188] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x12f/0xd50
[ 1010.716196] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440
[ 1010.716202] ? rtnl_fdb_dump+0x9f0/0x9f0
[ 1010.716208] ? netlink_ack+0xab0/0xab0
[ 1010.716213] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x202/0xd50
[ 1010.716220] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x218/0xd50
[ 1010.716226] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x30b/0x590
[ 1010.716233] netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800
[ 1010.716240] ? netlink_attachskb+0x870/0x870
[ 1010.716248] ? __check_object_size+0x2de/0x3b0
[ 1010.716254] netlink_sendmsg+0x938/0xe40
[ 1010.716261] ? netlink_unicast+0x800/0x800
[ 1010.716269] ? __import_iovec+0x292/0x510
[ 1010.716276] ? netlink_unicast+0x800/0x800
[ 1010.716284] __sock_sendmsg+0x159/0x190
[ 1010.716290] ____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x880
[ 1010.716297] ? sock_write_iter+0x3d0/0x3d0
[ 1010.716304] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x270/0x270
[ 1010.716309] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560
[ 1010.716315] ? drain_array_locked+0x90/0x90
[ 1010.716324] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170
[ 1010.716331] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x170/0x170
[ 1010.716337] ? lockdep_init_map
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: fsl-qdma: fix SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read
There is chip (ls1028a) errata:
The SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read transactions by QDMA.
Unaligned read transactions initiated by QDMA may stall in the NOC
(Network On-Chip), causing a deadlock condition. Stalled transactions will
trigger completion timeouts in PCIe controller.
Workaround:
Enable prefetch by setting the source descriptor prefetchable bit
( SD[PF] = 1 ).
Implement this workaround. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: fsl-qdma: init irq after reg initialization
Initialize the qDMA irqs after the registers are configured so that
interrupts that may have been pending from a primary kernel don't get
processed by the irq handler before it is ready to and cause panic with
the following trace:
Call trace:
fsl_qdma_queue_handler+0xf8/0x3e8
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x78/0x2b0
handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1c/0x68
handle_irq_event+0x44/0x78
handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc8/0x178
generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x38
__handle_domain_irq+0x90/0x100
gic_handle_irq+0x5c/0xb8
el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x14/0x40
__setup_irq+0x4bc/0x798
request_threaded_irq+0xd8/0x190
devm_request_threaded_irq+0x74/0xe8
fsl_qdma_probe+0x4d4/0xca8
platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xa0
really_probe+0xe0/0x3f8
driver_probe_device+0x64/0x130
device_driver_attach+0x6c/0x78
__driver_attach+0xbc/0x158
bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x98
driver_attach+0x20/0x28
bus_add_driver+0x158/0x220
driver_register+0x60/0x110
__platform_driver_register+0x44/0x50
fsl_qdma_driver_init+0x18/0x20
do_one_initcall+0x48/0x258
kernel_init_freeable+0x1a4/0x23c
kernel_init+0x10/0xf8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Fix protection fault in iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova
Syzkaller reported the following bug:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000038: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000001c0-0x00000000000001c7]
Call Trace:
lock_acquire
lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x4f0
down_read+0x93/0x4a0
iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova+0x56/0x1f0
iommufd_test_access_rw.isra.0+0x2ec/0x390
iommufd_test+0x1058/0x1e30
iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x381/0x510
vfs_ioctl
__do_sys_ioctl
__se_sys_ioctl
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x170/0x1e0
do_syscall_x64
do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140
This is because the new iommufd_access_change_ioas() sets access->ioas to
NULL during its process, so the lock might be gone in a concurrent racing
context.
Fix this by doing the same access->ioas sanity as iommufd_access_rw() and
iommufd_access_pin_pages() functions do. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: arm: Fix NULL dereference on scmi_perf_domain removal
On unloading of the scmi_perf_domain module got the below splat, when in
the DT provided to the system under test the '#power-domain-cells' property
was missing. Indeed, this particular setup causes the probe to bail out
early without giving any error, which leads to the ->remove() callback gets
to run too, but without all the expected initialized structures in place.
Add a check and bail out early on remove too.
Call trace:
scmi_perf_domain_remove+0x28/0x70 [scmi_perf_domain]
scmi_dev_remove+0x28/0x40 [scmi_core]
device_remove+0x54/0x90
device_release_driver_internal+0x1dc/0x240
driver_detach+0x58/0xa8
bus_remove_driver+0x78/0x108
driver_unregister+0x38/0x70
scmi_driver_unregister+0x28/0x180 [scmi_core]
scmi_perf_domain_driver_exit+0x18/0xb78 [scmi_perf_domain]
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1a8/0x2c0
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x34/0xb8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198
Code: a90153f3 f9403c14 f9414800 955f8a05 (b9400a80)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix possible deadlock in subflow diag
Syzbot and Eric reported a lockdep splat in the subflow diag:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00212-g40b9385dd8e6 #0 Not tainted
syz-executor.2/24141 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888045870130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
tcp_diag_put_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:100 [inline]
ffff888045870130 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at:
tcp_diag_get_aux+0x738/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:137
but task is already holding lock:
ffffc9000135e488 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock
include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffc9000135e488 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at:
inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x39f/0x1f80 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1038
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&h->lhash2[i].lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
__inet_hash+0x335/0xbe0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:743
inet_csk_listen_start+0x23a/0x320 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1261
__inet_listen_sk+0x2a2/0x770 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:217
inet_listen+0xa3/0x110 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:239
rds_tcp_listen_init+0x3fd/0x5a0 net/rds/tcp_listen.c:316
rds_tcp_init_net+0x141/0x320 net/rds/tcp.c:577
ops_init+0x352/0x610 net/core/net_namespace.c:136
__register_pernet_operations net/core/net_namespace.c:1214 [inline]
register_pernet_operations+0x2cb/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:1283
register_pernet_device+0x33/0x80 net/core/net_namespace.c:1370
rds_tcp_init+0x62/0xd0 net/rds/tcp.c:735
do_one_initcall+0x238/0x830 init/main.c:1236
do_initcall_level+0x157/0x210 init/main.c:1298
do_initcalls+0x3f/0x80 init/main.c:1314
kernel_init_freeable+0x42f/0x5d0 init/main.c:1551
kernel_init+0x1d/0x2a0 init/main.c:1441
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242
-> #0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
__lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
lock_sock_fast include/net/sock.h:1723 [inline]
subflow_get_info+0x166/0xd20 net/mptcp/diag.c:28
tcp_diag_put_ulp net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:100 [inline]
tcp_diag_get_aux+0x738/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_diag.c:137
inet_sk_diag_fill+0x10ed/0x1e00 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:345
inet_diag_dump_icsk+0x55b/0x1f80 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1061
__inet_diag_dump+0x211/0x3a0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1263
inet_diag_dump_compat+0x1c1/0x2d0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1371
netlink_dump+0x59b/0xc80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
__netlink_dump_start+0x5df/0x790 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x209/0x4c0 net/ipv4/inet_diag.c:1405
sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe7/0x410
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
As noted by Eric we can break the lock dependency chain avoid
dumping
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.
syzbot reported a task hung; at the same time, GC was looping infinitely
in list_for_each_entry_safe() for OOB skb. [0]
syzbot demonstrated that the list_for_each_entry_safe() was not actually
safe in this case.
A single skb could have references for multiple sockets. If we free such
a skb in the list_for_each_entry_safe(), the current and next sockets could
be unlinked in a single iteration.
unix_notinflight() uses list_del_init() to unlink the socket, so the
prefetched next socket forms a loop itself and list_for_each_entry_safe()
never stops.
Here, we must use while() and make sure we always fetch the first socket.
[0]:
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 5065 Comm: syz-executor236 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-syzkaller-00136-g1f719a2f3fa6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
RIP: 0010:preempt_count arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_kcov_mode kernel/kcov.c:173 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0xd/0x60 kernel/kcov.c:207
Code: cc cc cc cc 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 65 48 8b 14 25 40 c2 03 00 <65> 8b 05 b4 7c 78 7e a9 00 01 ff 00 48 8b 34 24 74 0f f6 c4 01 74
RSP: 0018:ffffc900033efa58 EFLAGS: 00000283
RAX: ffff88807b077800 RBX: ffff88807b077800 RCX: 1ffffffff27b1189
RDX: ffff88802a5a3b80 RSI: ffffffff8968488d RDI: ffff88807b077f70
RBP: ffffc900033efbb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff27a900c
R10: ffffffff93d48067 R11: ffffffff8ae000eb R12: ffff88807b077800
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88807b077e40 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000564f4fc1e3a8 CR3: 000000000d57a000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<NMI>
</NMI>
<TASK>
unix_gc+0x563/0x13b0 net/unix/garbage.c:319
unix_release_sock+0xa93/0xf80 net/unix/af_unix.c:683
unix_release+0x91/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:1064
__sock_release+0xb0/0x270 net/socket.c:659
sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1421
__fput+0x270/0xb80 fs/file_table.c:376
task_work_run+0x14f/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:180
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
do_exit+0xa8a/0x2ad0 kernel/exit.c:871
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:1020
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1031 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1029 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3e/0x50 kernel/exit.c:1029
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x270 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77
RIP: 0033:0x7f9d6cbdac09
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f9d6cbdabdf.
RSP: 002b:00007fff5952feb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f9d6cbdac09
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007f9d6cc552b0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000006
R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9d6cc552b0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f9d6cc55d00 R15: 00007f9d6cbabe70
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: nvidia-shield: Add missing null pointer checks to LED initialization
devm_kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
[jkosina@suse.com: tweak changelog a bit] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Disable IRQ before init_fn() for nonboot CPUs
Disable IRQ before init_fn() for nonboot CPUs when hotplug, in order to
silence such warnings (and also avoid potential errors due to unexpected
interrupts):
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/rcu/tree.c:4503 rcu_cpu_starting+0x214/0x280
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.6.17+ #1198
pc 90000000048e3334 ra 90000000047bd56c tp 900000010039c000 sp 900000010039fdd0
a0 0000000000000001 a1 0000000000000006 a2 900000000802c040 a3 0000000000000000
a4 0000000000000001 a5 0000000000000004 a6 0000000000000000 a7 90000000048e3f4c
t0 0000000000000001 t1 9000000005c70968 t2 0000000004000000 t3 000000000005e56e
t4 00000000000002e4 t5 0000000000001000 t6 ffffffff80000000 t7 0000000000040000
t8 9000000007931638 u0 0000000000000006 s9 0000000000000004 s0 0000000000000001
s1 9000000006356ac0 s2 9000000007244000 s3 0000000000000001 s4 0000000000000001
s5 900000000636f000 s6 7fffffffffffffff s7 9000000002123940 s8 9000000001ca55f8
ra: 90000000047bd56c tlb_init+0x24c/0x528
ERA: 90000000048e3334 rcu_cpu_starting+0x214/0x280
CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
PRMD: 00000000 (PPLV0 -PIE -PWE)
EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
ECFG: 00071000 (LIE=12 VS=7)
ESTAT: 000c0000 [BRK] (IS= ECode=12 EsubCode=0)
PRID: 0014c010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3A5000)
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.6.17+ #1198
Stack : 0000000000000000 9000000006375000 9000000005b61878 900000010039c000
900000010039fa30 0000000000000000 900000010039fa38 900000000619a140
9000000006456888 9000000006456880 900000010039f950 0000000000000001
0000000000000001 cb0cb028ec7e52e1 0000000002b90000 9000000100348700
0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ffffffff916d12f1 0000000000000003
0000000000040000 9000000007930370 0000000002b90000 0000000000000004
9000000006366000 900000000619a140 0000000000000000 0000000000000004
0000000000000000 0000000000000009 ffffffffffc681f2 9000000002123940
9000000001ca55f8 9000000006366000 90000000047a4828 00007ffff057ded8
00000000000000b0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000071000
...
Call Trace:
[<90000000047a4828>] show_stack+0x48/0x1a0
[<9000000005b61874>] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xcc
[<90000000047f60ac>] __warn+0x8c/0x1e0
[<9000000005b0ab34>] report_bug+0x1b4/0x280
[<9000000005b63110>] do_bp+0x2d0/0x480
[<90000000047a2e20>] handle_bp+0x120/0x1c0
[<90000000048e3334>] rcu_cpu_starting+0x214/0x280
[<90000000047bd568>] tlb_init+0x248/0x528
[<90000000047a4c44>] per_cpu_trap_init+0x124/0x160
[<90000000047a19f4>] cpu_probe+0x494/0xa00
[<90000000047b551c>] start_secondary+0x3c/0xc0
[<9000000005b66134>] smpboot_entry+0x50/0x58 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/pci: Fix disabling memory if DVSEC CXL Range does not match a CFMWS window
The Linux CXL subsystem is built on the assumption that HPA == SPA.
That is, the host physical address (HPA) the HDM decoder registers are
programmed with are system physical addresses (SPA).
During HDM decoder setup, the DVSEC CXL range registers (cxl-3.1,
8.1.3.8) are checked if the memory is enabled and the CXL range is in
a HPA window that is described in a CFMWS structure of the CXL host
bridge (cxl-3.1, 9.18.1.3).
Now, if the HPA is not an SPA, the CXL range does not match a CFMWS
window and the CXL memory range will be disabled then. The HDM decoder
stops working which causes system memory being disabled and further a
system hang during HDM decoder initialization, typically when a CXL
enabled kernel boots.
Prevent a system hang and do not disable the HDM decoder if the
decoder's CXL range is not found in a CFMWS window.
Note the change only fixes a hardware hang, but does not implement
HPA/SPA translation. Support for this can be added in a follow on
patch series. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery()
mddev_suspend() never stop sync_thread, hence it doesn't make sense to
ignore suspended array in md_check_recovery(), which might cause
sync_thread can't be unregistered.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) suspend the array:
raid_postsuspend
mddev_suspend
2) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
__md_stop_writes
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
3) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
4) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (mddev->suspended)
return; -> return directly
md_read_sync_thread
clear_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery);
-> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 2 hang;
This problem is not just related to dm-raid, fix it by ignoring
suspended array in md_check_recovery(). And follow up patches will
improve dm-raid better to frozen sync thread during suspend. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't ignore read-only array in md_check_recovery()
Usually if the array is not read-write, md_check_recovery() won't
register new sync_thread in the first place. And if the array is
read-write and sync_thread is registered, md_set_readonly() will
unregister sync_thread before setting the array read-only. md/raid
follow this behavior hence there is no problem.
After commit f52f5c71f3d4 ("md: fix stopping sync thread"), following
hang can be triggered by test shell/integrity-caching.sh:
1) array is read-only. dm-raid update super block:
rs_update_sbs
ro = mddev->ro
mddev->ro = 0
-> set array read-write
md_update_sb
2) register new sync thread concurrently.
3) dm-raid set array back to read-only:
rs_update_sbs
mddev->ro = ro
4) stop the array:
raid_dtr
md_stop
stop_sync_thread
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_INTR, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread_directly(mddev->sync_thread);
wait_event(..., !test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING, &mddev->recovery))
5) sync thread done:
md_do_sync
set_bit(MD_RECOVERY_DONE, &mddev->recovery);
md_wakeup_thread(mddev->thread);
6) daemon thread can't unregister sync thread:
md_check_recovery
if (!md_is_rdwr(mddev) &&
!test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_NEEDED, &mddev->recovery))
return;
-> -> MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING can't be cleared, hence step 4 hang;
The root cause is that dm-raid manipulate 'mddev->ro' by itself,
however, dm-raid really should stop sync thread before setting the
array read-only. Unfortunately, I need to read more code before I
can refacter the handler of 'mddev->ro' in dm-raid, hence let's fix
the problem the easy way for now to prevent dm-raid regression. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't register sync_thread for reshape directly
Currently, if reshape is interrupted, then reassemble the array will
register sync_thread directly from pers->run(), in this case
'MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING' is set directly, however, there is no guarantee
that md_do_sync() will be executed, hence stop_sync_thread() will hang
because 'MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING' can't be cleared.
Last patch make sure that md_do_sync() will set MD_RECOVERY_DONE,
however, following hang can still be triggered by dm-raid test
shell/lvconvert-raid-reshape.sh occasionally:
[root@fedora ~]# cat /proc/1982/stack
[<0>] stop_sync_thread+0x1ab/0x270 [md_mod]
[<0>] md_frozen_sync_thread+0x5c/0xa0 [md_mod]
[<0>] raid_presuspend+0x1e/0x70 [dm_raid]
[<0>] dm_table_presuspend_targets+0x40/0xb0 [dm_mod]
[<0>] __dm_destroy+0x2a5/0x310 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_destroy+0x16/0x30 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dev_remove+0x165/0x290 [dm_mod]
[<0>] ctl_ioctl+0x4bb/0x7b0 [dm_mod]
[<0>] dm_ctl_ioctl+0x11/0x20 [dm_mod]
[<0>] vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x60
[<0>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0xe0
[<0>] do_syscall_64+0xc6/0x230
[<0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74
Meanwhile mddev->recovery is:
MD_RECOVERY_RUNNING |
MD_RECOVERY_INTR |
MD_RECOVERY_RESHAPE |
MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN
Fix this problem by remove the code to register sync_thread directly
from raid10 and raid5. And let md_check_recovery() to register
sync_thread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: Don't suspend the array for interrupted reshape
md_start_sync() will suspend the array if there are spares that can be
added or removed from conf, however, if reshape is still in progress,
this won't happen at all or data will be corrupted(remove_and_add_spares
won't be called from md_choose_sync_action for reshape), hence there is
no need to suspend the array if reshape is not done yet.
Meanwhile, there is a potential deadlock for raid456:
1) reshape is interrupted;
2) set one of the disk WantReplacement, and add a new disk to the array,
however, recovery won't start until the reshape is finished;
3) then issue an IO across reshpae position, this IO will wait for
reshape to make progress;
4) continue to reshape, then md_start_sync() found there is a spare disk
that can be added to conf, mddev_suspend() is called;
Step 4 and step 3 is waiting for each other, deadlock triggered. Noted
this problem is found by code review, and it's not reporduced yet.
Fix this porblem by don't suspend the array for interrupted reshape,
this is safe because conf won't be changed until reshape is done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gtp: fix use-after-free and null-ptr-deref in gtp_genl_dump_pdp()
The gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be
registered before registering the generic netlink family.
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 1 PID: 5826 Comm: gtp Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-std-def-alt1 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp]
Code: c6 89 c6 e8 64 e9 86 df 58 45 85 f6 0f 85 4e 04 00 00 e8 c5 ee 86
df 48 8b 54 24 18 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80>
3c 02 00 0f 85 de 05 00 00 48 8b 44 24 18 4c 8b 30 4c 39 f0 74
RSP: 0018:ffff888014107220 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88800fcda588 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f1be4eb05c0(0000) GS:ffff88806ce80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1be4e766cf CR3: 000000000c33e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x90/0xa0
? die_addr+0x50/0xd0
? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? gtp_genl_dump_pdp+0x1be/0x800 [gtp]
? __alloc_skb+0x1dd/0x350
? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10
genl_dumpit+0x11d/0x230
netlink_dump+0x5b9/0xce0
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x253/0x430
? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10
? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x40
? __kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xa0
? genl_start+0x675/0x970
__netlink_dump_start+0x6fc/0x9f0
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x1bb/0x2d0
? __pfx_genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x10/0x10
? genl_op_from_small+0x2a/0x440
? cap_capable+0x1d0/0x240
? __pfx_genl_start+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_dumpit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_done+0x10/0x10
? security_capable+0x9d/0xe0 |
