| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: put off calling register_netdev() until client initialize complete
Currently, the netdevice is registered before client initializing
complete. So there is a timewindow between netdevice available
and usable. In this case, if user try to change the channel number
or ring param, it may cause the hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap() being called
twice, and report bug.
[47199.416502] hns3 0000:35:00.0 eth1: set channels: tqp_num=1, rxfh=0
[47199.430340] hns3 0000:35:00.0 eth1: already uninitialized
[47199.438554] hns3 0000:35:00.0: rss changes from 4 to 1
[47199.511854] hns3 0000:35:00.0: Channels changed, rss_size from 4 to 1, tqps from 4 to 1
[47200.163524] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[47200.171674] kernel BUG at lib/cpu_rmap.c:142!
[47200.177847] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[47200.185259] Modules linked in: hclge(+) hns3(-) hns3_cae(O) hns_roce_hw_v2 hnae3 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio pv680_mii(O) [last unloaded: hclge]
[47200.205912] CPU: 1 PID: 8260 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G O 5.11.0-rc3+ #1
[47200.215601] Hardware name: , xxxxxx 02/04/2021
[47200.223052] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[47200.230188] pc : cpu_rmap_add+0x38/0x40
[47200.237472] lr : irq_cpu_rmap_add+0x84/0x140
[47200.243291] sp : ffff800010e93a30
[47200.247295] x29: ffff800010e93a30 x28: ffff082100584880
[47200.254155] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[47200.260712] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000004
[47200.267241] x23: ffff08209ba03000 x22: ffff08209ba038c0
[47200.273789] x21: 000000000000003f x20: ffff0820e2bc1680
[47200.280400] x19: ffff0820c970ec80 x18: 00000000000000c0
[47200.286944] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffb43debe4a0d0
[47200.293456] x15: fffffc2082990600 x14: dead000000000122
[47200.300059] x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 000000000000003e
[47200.306606] x11: ffff0820815b8080 x10: ffff53e411988000
[47200.313171] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff0820e2bc1700
[47200.319682] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
[47200.326170] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff800010e93a20
[47200.332656] x3 : 0000000000000004 x2 : ffff0820c970ec80
[47200.339168] x1 : ffff0820e2bc1680 x0 : 0000000000000004
[47200.346058] Call trace:
[47200.349324] cpu_rmap_add+0x38/0x40
[47200.354300] hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap+0x6c/0xe0 [hns3]
[47200.362294] hns3_reset_notify_init_enet+0x1cc/0x340 [hns3]
[47200.370049] hns3_change_channels+0x40/0xb0 [hns3]
[47200.376770] hns3_set_channels+0x12c/0x2a0 [hns3]
[47200.383353] ethtool_set_channels+0x140/0x250
[47200.389772] dev_ethtool+0x714/0x23d0
[47200.394440] dev_ioctl+0x4cc/0x640
[47200.399277] sock_do_ioctl+0x100/0x2a0
[47200.404574] sock_ioctl+0x28c/0x470
[47200.409079] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0x100
[47200.415217] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x84/0x210
[47200.422088] do_el0_svc+0x28/0x34
[47200.426387] el0_svc+0x28/0x70
[47200.431308] el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0
[47200.436477] el0_sync+0x174/0x180
[47200.441562] Code: 11000405 79000c45 f8247861 d65f03c0 (d4210000)
[47200.448869] ---[ end trace a01efe4ce42e5f34 ]---
The process is like below:
excuting hns3_client_init
|
register_netdev()
| hns3_set_channels()
| |
hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap() hns3_reset_notify_uninit_enet()
| |
| quit without calling function
| hns3_free_rx_cpu_rmap for flag
| HNS3_NIC_STATE_INITED is unset.
| |
| hns3_reset_notify_init_enet()
| |
set HNS3_NIC_STATE_INITED call hns3_set_rx_cpu_rmap()-- crash
Fix it by calling register_netdev() at the end of function
hns3_client_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxgb4: avoid accessing registers when clearing filters
Hardware register having the server TID base can contain
invalid values when adapter is in bad state (for example,
due to AER fatal error). Reading these invalid values in the
register can lead to out-of-bound memory access. So, fix
by using the saved server TID base when clearing filters. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mt76: mt7921: fix possible AOOB issue in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report
Fix possible array out of bound access in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report.
Remove unnecessary varibable in mt7921_mcu_tx_rate_report |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
efi/fdt: fix panic when no valid fdt found
setup_arch() would invoke efi_init()->efi_get_fdt_params(). If no
valid fdt found then initial_boot_params will be null. So we
should stop further fdt processing here. I encountered this
issue on risc-v. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: amd_sfh: Fix memory leak in amd_sfh_work
Kmemleak tool detected a memory leak in the amd_sfh driver.
====================
unreferenced object 0xffff88810228ada0 (size 32):
comm "insmod", pid 3968, jiffies 4295056001 (age 775.792s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 20 73 1f 81 88 ff ff 00 01 00 00 00 00 ad de . s.............
22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 01 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 "...............
backtrace:
[<000000007b4c8799>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x163/0x4f0
[<0000000005326893>] amd_sfh_get_report+0xa4/0x1d0 [amd_sfh]
[<000000002a9e5ec4>] amdtp_hid_request+0x62/0x80 [amd_sfh]
[<00000000b8a95807>] sensor_hub_get_feature+0x145/0x270 [hid_sensor_hub]
[<00000000fda054ee>] hid_sensor_parse_common_attributes+0x215/0x460 [hid_sensor_iio_common]
[<0000000021279ecf>] hid_accel_3d_probe+0xff/0x4a0 [hid_sensor_accel_3d]
[<00000000915760ce>] platform_probe+0x6a/0xd0
[<0000000060258a1f>] really_probe+0x192/0x620
[<00000000fa812f2d>] driver_probe_device+0x14a/0x1d0
[<000000005e79f7fd>] __device_attach_driver+0xbd/0x110
[<0000000070d15018>] bus_for_each_drv+0xfd/0x160
[<0000000013a3c312>] __device_attach+0x18b/0x220
[<000000008c7b4afc>] device_initial_probe+0x13/0x20
[<00000000e6e99665>] bus_probe_device+0xfe/0x120
[<00000000833fa90b>] device_add+0x6a6/0xe00
[<00000000fa901078>] platform_device_add+0x180/0x380
====================
The fix is to freeing request_list entry once the processed entry is
removed from the request_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, lockdown, audit: Fix buggy SELinux lockdown permission checks
Commit 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown")
added an implementation of the locked_down LSM hook to SELinux, with the aim
to restrict which domains are allowed to perform operations that would breach
lockdown. This is indirectly also getting audit subsystem involved to report
events. The latter is problematic, as reported by Ondrej and Serhei, since it
can bring down the whole system via audit:
1) The audit events that are triggered due to calls to security_locked_down()
can OOM kill a machine, see below details [0].
2) It also seems to be causing a deadlock via avc_has_perm()/slow_avc_audit()
when trying to wake up kauditd, for example, when using trace_sched_switch()
tracepoint, see details in [1]. Triggering this was not via some hypothetical
corner case, but with existing tools like runqlat & runqslower from bcc, for
example, which make use of this tracepoint. Rough call sequence goes like:
rq_lock(rq) -> -------------------------+
trace_sched_switch() -> |
bpf_prog_xyz() -> +-> deadlock
selinux_lockdown() -> |
audit_log_end() -> |
wake_up_interruptible() -> |
try_to_wake_up() -> |
rq_lock(rq) --------------+
What's worse is that the intention of 59438b46471a to further restrict lockdown
settings for specific applications in respect to the global lockdown policy is
completely broken for BPF. The SELinux policy rule for the current lockdown check
looks something like this:
allow <who> <who> : lockdown { <reason> };
However, this doesn't match with the 'current' task where the security_locked_down()
is executed, example: httpd does a syscall. There is a tracing program attached
to the syscall which triggers a BPF program to run, which ends up doing a
bpf_probe_read_kernel{,_str}() helper call. The selinux_lockdown() hook does
the permission check against 'current', that is, httpd in this example. httpd
has literally zero relation to this tracing program, and it would be nonsensical
having to write an SELinux policy rule against httpd to let the tracing helper
pass. The policy in this case needs to be against the entity that is installing
the BPF program. For example, if bpftrace would generate a histogram of syscall
counts by user space application:
bpftrace -e 'tracepoint:raw_syscalls:sys_enter { @[comm] = count(); }'
bpftrace would then go and generate a BPF program from this internally. One way
of doing it [for the sake of the example] could be to call bpf_get_current_task()
helper and then access current->comm via one of bpf_probe_read_kernel{,_str}()
helpers. So the program itself has nothing to do with httpd or any other random
app doing a syscall here. The BPF program _explicitly initiated_ the lockdown
check. The allow/deny policy belongs in the context of bpftrace: meaning, you
want to grant bpftrace access to use these helpers, but other tracers on the
system like my_random_tracer _not_.
Therefore fix all three issues at the same time by taking a completely different
approach for the security_locked_down() hook, that is, move the check into the
program verification phase where we actually retrieve the BPF func proto. This
also reliably gets the task (current) that is trying to install the BPF tracing
program, e.g. bpftrace/bcc/perf/systemtap/etc, and it also fixes the OOM since
we're moving this out of the BPF helper's fast-path which can be called several
millions of times per second.
The check is then also in line with other security_locked_down() hooks in the
system where the enforcement is performed at open/load time, for example,
open_kcore() for /proc/kcore access or module_sig_check() for module signatures
just to pick f
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: track AF_XDP ZC enabled queues in bitmap
Commit c7a219048e45 ("ice: Remove xsk_buff_pool from VSI structure")
silently introduced a regression and broke the Tx side of AF_XDP in copy
mode. xsk_pool on ice_ring is set only based on the existence of the XDP
prog on the VSI which in turn picks ice_clean_tx_irq_zc to be executed.
That is not something that should happen for copy mode as it should use
the regular data path ice_clean_tx_irq.
This results in a following splat when xdpsock is run in txonly or l2fwd
scenarios in copy mode:
<snip>
[ 106.050195] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
[ 106.057269] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 106.062493] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 106.067709] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 106.070293] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 106.074721] CPU: 61 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/61 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2+ #45
[ 106.081436] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[ 106.092027] RIP: 0010:xp_raw_get_dma+0x36/0x50
[ 106.096551] Code: 74 14 48 b8 ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 48 21 f0 48 c1 ee 30 48 01 c6 48 8b 87 90 00 00 00 48 89 f2 81 e6 ff 0f 00 00 48 c1 ea 0c <48> 8b 04 d0 48 83 e0 fe 48 01 f0 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
[ 106.115588] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d694e50 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 106.120893] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88984b8c8a00 RCX: ffff889852581800
[ 106.128137] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88984cd8b800
[ 106.135383] RBP: ffff888123b50001 R08: ffff889896800000 R09: 0000000000000800
[ 106.142628] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff826060c0 R12: 00000000000000ff
[ 106.149872] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: ffff888123b50018
[ 106.157117] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8897e0f40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 106.165332] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 106.171163] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000000560a004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 106.178408] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 106.185653] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 106.192898] PKRU: 55555554
[ 106.195653] Call Trace:
[ 106.198143] <IRQ>
[ 106.200196] ice_clean_tx_irq_zc+0x183/0x2a0 [ice]
[ 106.205087] ice_napi_poll+0x3e/0x590 [ice]
[ 106.209356] __napi_poll+0x2a/0x160
[ 106.212911] net_rx_action+0xd6/0x200
[ 106.216634] __do_softirq+0xbf/0x29b
[ 106.220274] irq_exit_rcu+0x88/0xc0
[ 106.223819] common_interrupt+0x7b/0xa0
[ 106.227719] </IRQ>
[ 106.229857] asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
</snip>
Fix this by introducing the bitmap of queues that are zero-copy enabled,
where each bit, corresponding to a queue id that xsk pool is being
configured on, will be set/cleared within ice_xsk_pool_{en,dis}able and
checked within ice_xsk_pool(). The latter is a function used for
deciding which napi poll routine is executed.
Idea is being taken from our other drivers such as i40e and ixgbe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sch_htb: fix refcount leak in htb_parent_to_leaf_offload
The commit ae81feb7338c ("sch_htb: fix null pointer dereference
on a null new_q") fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug, but it
is not correct.
Because htb_graft_helper properly handles the case when new_q
is NULL, and after the previous patch by skipping this call
which creates an inconsistency : dev_queue->qdisc will still
point to the old qdisc, but cl->parent->leaf.q will point to
the new one (which will be noop_qdisc, because new_q was NULL).
The code is based on an assumption that these two pointers are
the same, so it can lead to refcount leaks.
The correct fix is to add a NULL pointer check to protect
qdisc_refcount_inc inside htb_parent_to_leaf_offload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: fix ltout double free on completion race
Always remove linked timeout on io_link_timeout_fn() from the master
request link list, otherwise we may get use-after-free when first
io_link_timeout_fn() puts linked timeout in the fail path, and then
will be found and put on master's free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: caif: fix memory leak in caif_device_notify
In case of caif_enroll_dev() fail, allocated
link_support won't be assigned to the corresponding
structure. So simply free allocated pointer in case
of error |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: caif: fix memory leak in cfusbl_device_notify
In case of caif_enroll_dev() fail, allocated
link_support won't be assigned to the corresponding
structure. So simply free allocated pointer in case
of error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: magicmouse: fix NULL-deref on disconnect
Commit 9d7b18668956 ("HID: magicmouse: add support for Apple Magic
Trackpad 2") added a sanity check for an Apple trackpad but returned
success instead of -ENODEV when the check failed. This means that the
remove callback will dereference the never-initialised driver data
pointer when the driver is later unbound (e.g. on USB disconnect). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_fill_super
Buffer head references must be released before calling kill_bdev();
otherwise the buffer head (and its page referenced by b_data) will not
be freed by kill_bdev, and subsequently that bh will be leaked.
If blocksizes differ, sb_set_blocksize() will kill current buffers and
page cache by using kill_bdev(). And then super block will be reread
again but using correct blocksize this time. sb_set_blocksize() didn't
fully free superblock page and buffer head, and being busy, they were
not freed and instead leaked.
This can easily be reproduced by calling an infinite loop of:
systemctl start <ext4_on_lvm>.mount, and
systemctl stop <ext4_on_lvm>.mount
... since systemd creates a cgroup for each slice which it mounts, and
the bh leak get amplified by a dying memory cgroup that also never
gets freed, and memory consumption is much more easily noticed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pid: take a reference when initializing `cad_pid`
During boot, kernel_init_freeable() initializes `cad_pid` to the init
task's struct pid. Later on, we may change `cad_pid` via a sysctl, and
when this happens proc_do_cad_pid() will increment the refcount on the
new pid via get_pid(), and will decrement the refcount on the old pid
via put_pid(). As we never called get_pid() when we initialized
`cad_pid`, we decrement a reference we never incremented, can therefore
free the init task's struct pid early. As there can be dangling
references to the struct pid, we can later encounter a use-after-free
(e.g. when delivering signals).
This was spotted when fuzzing v5.13-rc3 with Syzkaller, but seems to
have been around since the conversion of `cad_pid` to struct pid in
commit 9ec52099e4b8 ("[PATCH] replace cad_pid by a struct pid") from the
pre-KASAN stone age of v2.6.19.
Fix this by getting a reference to the init task's struct pid when we
assign it to `cad_pid`.
Full KASAN splat below.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
Read of size 4 at addr ffff23794dda0004 by task syz-executor.0/273
CPU: 1 PID: 273 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.12.0-00001-g9aef892b2d15 #1
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
ns_of_pid include/linux/pid.h:153 [inline]
task_active_pid_ns+0xc0/0xc8 kernel/pid.c:509
do_notify_parent+0x308/0xe60 kernel/signal.c:1950
exit_notify kernel/exit.c:682 [inline]
do_exit+0x2334/0x2bd0 kernel/exit.c:845
do_group_exit+0x108/0x2c8 kernel/exit.c:922
get_signal+0x4e4/0x2a88 kernel/signal.c:2781
do_signal arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:882 [inline]
do_notify_resume+0x300/0x970 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c:936
work_pending+0xc/0x2dc
Allocated by task 0:
slab_post_alloc_hook+0x50/0x5c0 mm/slab.h:516
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2907 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2915 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f4/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:2920
alloc_pid+0xdc/0xc00 kernel/pid.c:180
copy_process+0x2794/0x5e18 kernel/fork.c:2129
kernel_clone+0x194/0x13c8 kernel/fork.c:2500
kernel_thread+0xd4/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2552
rest_init+0x44/0x4a0 init/main.c:687
arch_call_rest_init+0x1c/0x28
start_kernel+0x520/0x554 init/main.c:1064
0x0
Freed by task 270:
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1562 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x98/0x260 mm/slub.c:1600
slab_free mm/slub.c:3161 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x224/0x8e0 mm/slub.c:3177
put_pid.part.4+0xe0/0x1a8 kernel/pid.c:114
put_pid+0x30/0x48 kernel/pid.c:109
proc_do_cad_pid+0x190/0x1b0 kernel/sysctl.c:1401
proc_sys_call_handler+0x338/0x4b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:591
proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:617
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1977 [inline]
new_sync_write+0x3ac/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518
vfs_write fs/read_write.c:605 [inline]
vfs_write+0x9c4/0x1018 fs/read_write.c:585
ksys_write+0x124/0x240 fs/read_write.c:658
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:670 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:667 [inline]
__arm64_sys_write+0x78/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:667
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 [inline]
el0_svc_common.constprop.1+0x16c/0x388 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
do_el0_svc+0xf8/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:168
el0_svc+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:416
el0_sync_handler+0x134/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:432
el0_sync+0x154/0x180 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:701
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff23794dda0000
which belongs to the cache pid of size 224
The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
224-byte region [ff
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/mediatek: hdmi: Perform NULL pointer check for mtk_hdmi_conf
In commit 41ca9caaae0b
("drm/mediatek: hdmi: Add check for CEA modes only") a check
for CEA modes was added to function mtk_hdmi_bridge_mode_valid()
in order to address possible issues on MT8167;
moreover, with commit c91026a938c2
("drm/mediatek: hdmi: Add optional limit on maximal HDMI mode clock")
another similar check was introduced.
Unfortunately though, at the time of writing, MT8173 does not provide
any mtk_hdmi_conf structure and this is crashing the kernel with NULL
pointer upon entering mtk_hdmi_bridge_mode_valid(), which happens as
soon as a HDMI cable gets plugged in.
To fix this regression, add a NULL pointer check for hdmi->conf in the
said function, restoring HDMI functionality and avoiding NULL pointer
kernel panics. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix use-after-free in nft_set_catchall_destroy()
We need to use list_for_each_entry_safe() iterator
because we can not access @catchall after kfree_rcu() call.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nft_set_catchall_destroy net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4486 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nft_set_destroy net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4504 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nft_set_destroy+0x3fd/0x4f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4493
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880716e5b80 by task syz-executor.3/8871
CPU: 1 PID: 8871 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x2ed mm/kasan/report.c:247
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:433 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:450
nft_set_catchall_destroy net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4486 [inline]
nft_set_destroy net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4504 [inline]
nft_set_destroy+0x3fd/0x4f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4493
__nft_release_table+0x79f/0xcd0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:9626
nft_rcv_nl_event+0x4f8/0x670 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:9688
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
blocking_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:318 [inline]
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:306
netlink_release+0xcb6/0x1dd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:788
__sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:649
sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1314
__fput+0x286/0x9f0 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x27e/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:207
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:300
do_syscall_64+0x42/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f75fbf28adb
Code: 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 45 c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 63 fc ff ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 fc ff ff 8b 44
RSP: 002b:00007ffd8da7ec10 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f75fbf28adb
RDX: 00007f75fc08e828 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f75fc08a960 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f75fc08e830
R10: 00007ffd8da7ed10 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000002067c3
R13: 00007ffd8da7ed10 R14: 00007f75fc088f60 R15: 0000000000000032
</TASK>
Allocated by task 8886:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:434 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:472 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa6/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:522
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:269 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1ea/0x4a0 mm/slab.c:3575
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:590 [inline]
nft_setelem_catchall_insert net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5544 [inline]
nft_setelem_insert net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5562 [inline]
nft_add_set_elem+0x232e/0x2f40 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5936
nf_tables_newsetelem+0x6ff/0xbb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:6032
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0x1710/0x25f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:513
nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:634 [inline]
nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:652
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: xsk: return xsk buffers back to pool when cleaning the ring
Currently we only NULL the xdp_buff pointer in the internal SW ring but
we never give it back to the xsk buffer pool. This means that buffers
can be leaked out of the buff pool and never be used again.
Add missing xsk_buff_free() call to the routine that is supposed to
clean the entries that are left in the ring so that these buffers in the
umem can be used by other sockets.
Also, only go through the space that is actually left to be cleaned
instead of a whole ring. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: marvell: prestera: fix incorrect structure access
In line:
upper = info->upper_dev;
We access upper_dev field, which is related only for particular events
(e.g. event == NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER). So, this line cause invalid memory
access for another events,
when ptr is not netdev_notifier_changeupper_info.
The KASAN logs are as follows:
[ 30.123165] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in prestera_netdev_port_event.constprop.0+0x68/0x538 [prestera]
[ 30.133336] Read of size 8 at addr ffff80000cf772b0 by task udevd/778
[ 30.139866]
[ 30.141398] CPU: 0 PID: 778 Comm: udevd Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3 #6
[ 30.147588] Hardware name: DNI AmazonGo1 A7040 board (DT)
[ 30.153056] Call trace:
[ 30.155547] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2c0
[ 30.159320] show_stack+0x18/0x30
[ 30.162729] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 30.166491] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8
[ 30.172346] kasan_report+0x1e8/0x250
[ 30.176102] __asan_load8+0x98/0xe0
[ 30.179682] prestera_netdev_port_event.constprop.0+0x68/0x538 [prestera]
[ 30.186847] prestera_netdev_event_handler+0x1b4/0x1c0 [prestera]
[ 30.193313] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x74/0xa0
[ 30.197860] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x68/0xc0
[ 30.202924] register_netdevice+0x3cc/0x760
[ 30.207190] register_netdev+0x24/0x50
[ 30.211015] prestera_device_register+0x8a0/0xba0 [prestera] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
asix: fix uninit-value in asix_mdio_read()
asix_read_cmd() may read less than sizeof(smsr) bytes and in this case
smsr will be uninitialized.
Fail log:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in asix_check_host_enable drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:82 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in asix_check_host_enable drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:82 [inline] drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:497
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in asix_mdio_read+0x3c1/0xb00 drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:497 drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:497
asix_check_host_enable drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:82 [inline]
asix_check_host_enable drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:82 [inline] drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:497
asix_mdio_read+0x3c1/0xb00 drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:497 drivers/net/usb/asix_common.c:497 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Fix UAF when uninstall ipmi_si and ipmi_msghandler module
Hi,
When testing install and uninstall of ipmi_si.ko and ipmi_msghandler.ko,
the system crashed.
The log as follows:
[ 141.087026] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc09b3a5a
[ 141.087241] PGD 8fe4c0d067 P4D 8fe4c0d067 PUD 8fe4c0f067 PMD 103ad89067 PTE 0
[ 141.087464] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 141.087580] CPU: 67 PID: 668 Comm: kworker/67:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0.x86_64 #47
[ 141.088009] Workqueue: events 0xffffffffc09b3a40
[ 141.088009] RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc09b3a5a
[ 141.088009] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 141.088009] RSP: 0018:ffffb9094e2c3e88 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 141.088009] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9abfdb1f04a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 141.088009] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[ 141.088009] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff9abfffee3cb8 R09: 00000000000002e1
[ 141.088009] R10: ffffb9094cb73d90 R11: 00000000000f4240 R12: ffff9abfffee8700
[ 141.088009] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9abfdb1f04a0 R15: ffff9abfdb1f04a8
[ 141.088009] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9abfffec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 141.088009] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 141.088009] CR2: ffffffffc09b3a30 CR3: 0000008fe4c0a001 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[ 141.088009] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 141.088009] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 141.088009] PKRU: 55555554
[ 141.088009] Call Trace:
[ 141.088009] ? process_one_work+0x195/0x390
[ 141.088009] ? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[ 141.088009] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 141.088009] ? kthread+0x10d/0x130
[ 141.088009] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 141.088009] ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc0b28a5a
[ 200.223240] PGD 97fe00d067 P4D 97fe00d067 PUD 97fe00f067 PMD a580cbf067 PTE 0
[ 200.223464] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 200.223579] CPU: 63 PID: 664 Comm: kworker/63:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.18.0.x86_64 #46
[ 200.224008] Workqueue: events 0xffffffffc0b28a40
[ 200.224008] RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0b28a5a
[ 200.224008] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 200.224008] RSP: 0018:ffffbf3c8e2a3e88 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 200.224008] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa0799ad6bca0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 200.224008] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
[ 200.224008] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff9fe43fde3cb8 R09: 00000000000000d5
[ 200.224008] R10: ffffbf3c8cb53d90 R11: 00000000000f4240 R12: ffff9fe43fde8700
[ 200.224008] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffa0799ad6bca0 R15: ffffa0799ad6bca8
[ 200.224008] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fe43fdc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 200.224008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 200.224008] CR2: ffffffffc0b28a30 CR3: 00000097fe00a002 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[ 200.224008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 200.224008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 200.224008] PKRU: 55555554
[ 200.224008] Call Trace:
[ 200.224008] ? process_one_work+0x195/0x390
[ 200.224008] ? worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[ 200.224008] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[ 200.224008] ? kthread+0x10d/0x130
[ 200.224008] ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 200.224008] ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 200.224008] kernel fault(0x1) notification starting on CPU 63
[ 200.224008] kernel fault(0x1) notification finished on CPU 63
[ 200.224008] CR2: ffffffffc0b28a5a
[ 200.224008] ---[ end trace c82a412d93f57412 ]---
The reason is as follows:
T1: rmmod ipmi_si.
->ipmi_unregister_smi()
-> ipmi_bmc_unregister()
-> __ipmi_bmc_unregister()
-> kref_put(&bmc->usecount, cleanup_bmc_device);
-> schedule_work(&bmc->remove_work);
T2: rmmod ipmi_msghandl
---truncated--- |
