| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Centrifugo is an open-source scalable real-time messaging server. Prior to 6.8.4, Centrifugo unidirectional WebSocket transport with uni_websocket.compression enabled enforced uni_websocket.message_size_limit against compressed wire-frame length in internal/websocket/conn.go advanceFrame, but ReadMessage used io.ReadAll after decompression without an output cap, allowing unauthenticated requests to /connection/uni_websocket to trigger large memory and CPU consumption. This issue is fixed in version 6.8.4. |
| CrowdSec offers crowdsourced protection against malicious IPs. From 1.7.0 until 1.7.8, the LAPI router used gin-contrib/gzip with DefaultDecompressHandle globally in pkg/apiserver/controllers/controller.go, causing /v1/watchers and /v1/watchers/login to decompress unauthenticated gzip-compressed JSON request bodies without enforcing a maximum decompressed size and allowing excessive heap allocation that can make LAPI unreachable. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.8. |
| Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.6, Tornado gzip decompression routines processed limited-size chunks but did not enforce an overall limit on accumulated decompressed chunks, allowing a malicious server accessed by SimpleAsyncHTTPClient or an HTTPServer configured with decompress_request=True to consume effectively unlimited memory. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.6. |
| NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker can cause improper handling of highly compressed data. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. |
| Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup's WebSocket implementation when using the permessage-deflate extension. The extension's decompression loop (inflate()) processes data in chunks without enforcing an upper boundary limit on the output buffer size. While libsoup limits the incoming compressed frame size via max_incoming_payload_size, it fails to track or limit memory allocation during decompression. A separate check for decompressed size (max_total_message_size) exists but executes only after inflation is complete, and it is entirely disabled by default for client connections. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending a small, highly compressed payload (a decompression bomb), causing unbounded memory allocation that triggers an Out-of-Memory (OOM) crash and a Denial of Service (DoS). |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.1.0 until 12.3.0, PdfParser.PdfStream.decode() in PIL/PdfParser.py calls zlib.decompress() with bufsize set to the PDF stream Length field without bounding the decompressed output size, allowing a crafted FlateDecode PDF stream to exhaust memory from a small file. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| An attacker with access to an HX 10.0.0 and previous versions, may send specially-crafted data to the HX console. The malicious detection would then trigger decompression of a large file that consumes an excessive amount of system resources thus causing a Denial of Service. |
| HedgeDoc is an open source, real-time, collaborative, markdown notes application. Prior to version 1.11.0, HedgeDoc was vulnerable to a YAML alias bomb due to unsafe processing of the note frontmatter. HedgeDoc parsed frontmatter with js-yaml.load (js-yaml v3) via @hedgedoc/meta-marked, which resolved YAML anchor aliases. A compact malicious payload could therefore expand into a huge object structure, consuming excessive CPU. This expansion ran on every request to the publish view (/s/<shortid>) and, when placed under the opengraph key, the editor view (/<noteId>). A ten-level alias bomb could block the single Node.js event loop for roughly 235 seconds per request, causing concurrent requests to hang or drop and rendering the instance unavailable (DoS). Because the note was stored in the database, the impact survived process restarts until the note was removed. toobusy-js did not reliably mitigate the worst cases, as the event loop was saturated before the middleware could respond. This issue was fixed in version 1.11.0. |
| adm-zip before 0.5.18 is vulnerable to denial of service via a crafted ZIP file with a manipulated uncompressed size header field. In zipEntry.js line 103, Buffer.alloc(_centralHeader.size) allocates memory based on the declared uncompressed size from the ZIP central directory header without validating it against the actual compressed data size or imposing any upper bound. The size value is read directly from the binary header at entryHeader.js line 266 with no bounds check. An attacker can craft a ~120-byte ZIP file that declares ~4GB uncompressed size, causing a memory allocation amplification ratio of over 33 million to 1. The allocation occurs before CRC validation, so the malicious payload cannot be rejected early. All extraction and read methods are affected: readFile(), readAsText(), extractEntryTo(), extractAllTo(), extractAllToAsync(), test(), and entry.getData(). Any application accepting untrusted ZIP files via adm-zip is vulnerable to immediate process crash. |
| Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.0, an authenticated admin.super user can crash Grav or fill the disk by uploading a specially crafted ZIP archive through the Direct Install tool because Installer::unZip calls ZipArchive::extractTo without limits on uncompressed size, entry count, or directory depth. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0. |
| httplib2 is a comprehensive HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 0.32.0, httplib2 performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate in _decompressContent in httplib2/init.py, allowing a malicious or compromised HTTP server to return a small compressed payload that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory and causes MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| Grav before 2.0.1 contains a decompression bomb vulnerability in ZipArchiver::extract() that lacks limits on uncompressed size, file count, and nesting depth. Attackers can supply a crafted ZIP archive that expands to fill available disk space, causing denial of service by exhausting storage resources. |
| rpcx through 1.9.3, fixed in commit 047aec1, contains a denial-of-service vulnerability in protocol.Message.Decode (protocol/message.go). When a message has the compression flag set, the payload is gzip-decompressed via util.Unzip with no limit on the decompressed output size. The only built-in size guard, protocol.MaxMessageLength, is checked against the compressed on-the-wire frame length, not the decompressed size, so it provides no protection. Because decoding (and decompression) occurs in readRequest before authentication, a single unauthenticated connection can send a small (under 2 MB) gzip-compressed message that expands to gigabytes of heap allocation, leading to out-of-memory conditions and service unavailability. |
| Fluentd collects events from various data sources and writes them to files, RDBMS, NoSQL, IaaS, SaaS, Hadoop and so on. Prior to 1.19.3, Fluentd's in_http and in_forward plugins support gzip-compressed data but enforce limits only on compressed payloads through settings such as body_size_limit and chunk_size_limit, allowing crafted compressed payloads to decompress in memory to an excessive size and cause denial of service through memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 1.19.3. |
| py7zr is a Python-based library and utility to support 7zip archive compression, decompression, encryption and decryption. Prior to 1.1.3, py7zr's Worker.decompress() extracted archive entries without tracking total decompressed size, allowing a crafted .7z file such as a 15.6 KB archive that expands to 100 MB to exhaust disk or memory before extraction completes. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.3. |
| Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Starting in version 2.17.0 and prior to versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, `POST /api/v2/files` converts zip uploads to tar in memory via `CreateTarFromZip`, which enforced a per-entry size limit but no aggregate limit on total decompressed output, writing to an unbounded in-memory buffer. Exploitation requires authenticated file-upload access and the impact is limited to availability (denial of service). The fix in versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 adds a metadata preflight check that sums projected entry sizes and a streaming writer that enforces the aggregate limit during decompression. As a workaround, restrict file-upload permissions to trusted users or place a reverse proxy with request-body size limits in front of `coderd`. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/PcfFontFile.py _load_bitmaps() read glyph dimensions from the PCF METRICS section and passed them directly to Image.frombytes() without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing crafted PCF font data to cause excessive memory allocation. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| A weakness has been identified in GPAC up to 26.02.0. This affects an unknown part of the file src/utils/base_encoding.c of the component ISOBMFF Parser. Executing a manipulation can lead to highly compressed data. The attack needs to be launched locally. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This patch is called 297f2d8d1f493d8b241330533cd47f7da758aeb3. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue. The vendor confirms: "We added a check on inflate output size, if it surpasses 32 times the input size we stop in error. This value could be adjusted later." |
| Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.45.0 until 2.91.0, the METS-GBS backend's XML parsing and the input document format detection lacked security controls. An attacker could craft malicious METS-GBS archives that, when processed, could read sensitive files, exhaust system resources, or cause application crashes. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.91.0. |
