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Search Results (20893 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-68229 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: tcm_loop: Fix segfault in tcm_loop_tpg_address_show() If the allocation of tl_hba->sh fails in tcm_loop_driver_probe() and we attempt to dereference it in tcm_loop_tpg_address_show() we will get a segfault, see below for an example. So, check tl_hba->sh before dereferencing it. Unable to allocate struct scsi_host BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000194 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 8356 Comm: tokio-runtime-w Not tainted 6.6.104.2-4.azl3 #1 Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 09/28/2024 RIP: 0010:tcm_loop_tpg_address_show+0x2e/0x50 [tcm_loop] ... Call Trace: <TASK> configfs_read_iter+0x12d/0x1d0 [configfs] vfs_read+0x1b5/0x300 ksys_read+0x6f/0xf0 ... | ||||
| CVE-2025-71089 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu: disable SVA when CONFIG_X86 is set Patch series "Fix stale IOTLB entries for kernel address space", v7. This proposes a fix for a security vulnerability related to IOMMU Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA). In an SVA context, an IOMMU can cache kernel page table entries. When a kernel page table page is freed and reallocated for another purpose, the IOMMU might still hold stale, incorrect entries. This can be exploited to cause a use-after-free or write-after-free condition, potentially leading to privilege escalation or data corruption. This solution introduces a deferred freeing mechanism for kernel page table pages, which provides a safe window to notify the IOMMU to invalidate its caches before the page is reused. This patch (of 8): In the IOMMU Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA) context, the IOMMU hardware shares and walks the CPU's page tables. The x86 architecture maps the kernel's virtual address space into the upper portion of every process's page table. Consequently, in an SVA context, the IOMMU hardware can walk and cache kernel page table entries. The Linux kernel currently lacks a notification mechanism for kernel page table changes, specifically when page table pages are freed and reused. The IOMMU driver is only notified of changes to user virtual address mappings. This can cause the IOMMU's internal caches to retain stale entries for kernel VA. Use-After-Free (UAF) and Write-After-Free (WAF) conditions arise when kernel page table pages are freed and later reallocated. The IOMMU could misinterpret the new data as valid page table entries. The IOMMU might then walk into attacker-controlled memory, leading to arbitrary physical memory DMA access or privilege escalation. This is also a Write-After-Free issue, as the IOMMU will potentially continue to write Accessed and Dirty bits to the freed memory while attempting to walk the stale page tables. Currently, SVA contexts are unprivileged and cannot access kernel mappings. However, the IOMMU will still walk kernel-only page tables all the way down to the leaf entries, where it realizes the mapping is for the kernel and errors out. This means the IOMMU still caches these intermediate page table entries, making the described vulnerability a real concern. Disable SVA on x86 architecture until the IOMMU can receive notification to flush the paging cache before freeing the CPU kernel page table pages. | ||||
| CVE-2025-71194 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix deadlock in wait_current_trans() due to ignored transaction type When wait_current_trans() is called during start_transaction(), it currently waits for a blocked transaction without considering whether the given transaction type actually needs to wait for that particular transaction state. The btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] array already defines which transaction types should wait for which transaction states, but this check was missing in wait_current_trans(). This can lead to a deadlock scenario involving two transactions and pending ordered extents: 1. Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state 2. A worker processing an ordered extent calls start_transaction() with TRANS_JOIN 3. join_transaction() returns -EBUSY because Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING 4. Transaction A moves to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED and completes 5. A new Transaction B is created (TRANS_STATE_RUNNING) 6. The ordered extent from step 2 is added to Transaction B's pending ordered extents 7. Transaction B immediately starts commit by another task and enters TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START 8. The worker finally reaches wait_current_trans(), sees Transaction B in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START (a blocked state), and waits unconditionally 9. However, TRANS_JOIN should NOT wait for TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START according to btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] 10. Transaction B is waiting for pending ordered extents to complete 11. Deadlock: Transaction B waits for ordered extent, ordered extent waits for Transaction B This can be illustrated by the following call stacks: CPU0 CPU1 btrfs_finish_ordered_io() start_transaction(TRANS_JOIN) join_transaction() # -EBUSY (Transaction A is # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING) # Transaction A completes # Transaction B created # ordered extent added to # Transaction B's pending list btrfs_commit_transaction() # Transaction B enters # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START # waiting for pending ordered # extents wait_current_trans() # waits for Transaction B # (should not wait!) Task bstore_kv_sync in btrfs_commit_transaction waiting for ordered extents: __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0 schedule+0x64/0xe0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xbf7/0xda0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x342/0x4d0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4b/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Task kworker in wait_current_trans waiting for transaction commit: Workqueue: btrfs-syno_nocow btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0 schedule+0x64/0xe0 wait_current_trans+0xb0/0x110 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x346/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0x49b/0x9c0 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0xe8/0x350 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x1d3/0x3c0 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0 kthread+0x12d/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fix this by passing the transaction type to wait_current_trans() and checking btrfs_blocked_trans_types[cur_trans->state] against the given type before deciding to wait. This ensures that transaction types which are allowed to join during certain blocked states will not unnecessarily wait and cause deadlocks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46020 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid for node_mem_{used,free}_bp Patch series "mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid". node_mem[cg]_{used,free}_bp DAMOS quota goals receive the node id. The node id is used for si_meminfo_node() and NODE_DATA() without proper validation. As a result, privileged users can trigger an out of bounds memory access using DAMON_SYSFS. Fix the issues. The issue was originally reported [1] with a fix by another author. The original author announced [2] that they will stop working including the fix that was still in the review stage. Hence I'm restarting this. This patch (of 2): Users can set damos_quota_goal->nid with arbitrary value for node_mem_{used,free}_bp. But DAMON core is using those for si_meminfo_node() without the validation of the value. This can result in out of bounds memory access. The issue can actually triggered using DAMON user-space tool (damo), like below. $ sudo ./damo start --damos_action stat \ --damos_quota_goal node_mem_used_bp 50% -1 \ --damos_quota_interval 1s $ sudo dmesg [...] [ 65.565986] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098 Fix this issue by adding the validation of the given node. If an invalid node id is given, it returns 0% for used memory ratio, and 100% for free memory ratio. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46022 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60). A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value after the loop has already started. The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(), which computes: queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input) with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers. For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception. Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted hardware state is transient. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46023 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log() The argument count calculation in create_dirty_log() performs `*args_used = 2 + param_count` before validating against argc. When a user provides a param_count close to UINT_MAX via the device mapper table string, this unsigned addition wraps around to a small value, causing the subsequent `argc < *args_used` check to be bypassed. The overflowed param_count is then passed as argc to dm_dirty_log_create(), where it can cause out-of-bounds reads on the argv array. Fix by comparing param_count against argc - 2 before performing the addition, following the same pattern used by parse_features() in the same file. Since argc >= 2 is already guaranteed, the subtraction is safe. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46024 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply() If a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a zero value for both protocol and result, this is currently not treated as an error. In case of ac->negotiating == true and ac->protocol > 0, this leads to setting ac->protocol = 0 and ac->ops = NULL. Thereafter, the check for ac->protocol != protocol returns false, and init_protocol() is not called. Subsequently, ac->ops->handle_reply() is called, which leads to a null pointer dereference, because ac->ops is still NULL. This patch changes the check for ac->protocol != protocol to !ac->protocol, as this also includes the case when the protocol was set to zero in the message. This causes the message to be treated as containing a bad auth protocol. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46025 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: fix damon_call() vs kdamond_fn() exit race Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit race". damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they race with kdamond terminations. Fix those. This patch (of 2); When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request. The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks. For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call() requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads infinitely waits. Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request. After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together. Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel, the request memory would be leaked. The issue is found by sashiko [1]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46027 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: avoid early lgr access in smc_clc_wait_msg A CLC decline can be received while the handshake is still in an early stage, before the connection has been associated with a link group. The decline handling in smc_clc_wait_msg() updates link-group level sync state for first-contact declines, but that state only exists after link group setup has completed. Guard the link-group update accordingly and keep the per-socket peer diagnosis handling unchanged. This preserves the existing sync_err handling for established link-group contexts and avoids touching link-group state before it is available. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46028 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can update that shared state before the original request has fully completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling. Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46029 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: return NULL early from kmalloc_nolock() in NMI on UP On UP kernels (!CONFIG_SMP), spin_trylock() is a no-op that unconditionally succeeds even when the lock is already held. As a result, kmalloc_nolock() called from NMI context can re-enter the slab allocator and acquire n->list_lock that the interrupted context is already holding, corrupting slab state. With CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK on UP, the following BUG is triggered with the slub_kunit test module: BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kunit_try_catch/243 [...] Call Trace: <NMI> dump_stack_lvl+0x3f/0x60 do_raw_spin_trylock+0x41/0x50 _raw_spin_trylock+0x24/0x50 get_from_partial_node+0x120/0x4d0 ___slab_alloc+0x8a/0x4c0 kmalloc_nolock_noprof+0x164/0x310 [...] </NMI> Fix this by returning NULL early when invoked from NMI on a UP kernel. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46001 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pt5161l) Fix bugs in pt5161l_read_block_data() Fix two bugs in pt5161l_read_block_data(): 1. Buffer overrun: The local buffer rbuf is declared as u8 rbuf[24], but i2c_smbus_read_block_data() can return up to I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32) bytes. The i2c-core copies the data into the caller's buffer before the return value can be checked, so the post-read length validation does not prevent a stack overrun if a device returns more than 24 bytes. Resize the buffer to I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX. 2. Unexpected positive return on length mismatch: When all three retries are exhausted because the device returns data with an unexpected length, i2c_smbus_read_block_data() returns a positive byte count. The function returns this directly, and callers treat any non-negative return as success, processing stale or incomplete buffer contents. Return -EIO when retries are exhausted with a positive return value, preserving the negative error code on I2C failure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46002 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext2: reject inodes with zero i_nlink and valid mode in ext2_iget() ext2_iget() already rejects inodes with i_nlink == 0 when i_mode is zero or i_dtime is set, treating them as deleted. However, the case of i_nlink == 0 with a non-zero mode and zero dtime slips through. Since ext2 has no orphan list, such a combination can only result from filesystem corruption - a legitimate inode deletion always sets either i_dtime or clears i_mode before freeing the inode. A crafted image can exploit this gap to present such an inode to the VFS, which then triggers WARN_ON inside drop_nlink() (fs/inode.c) via ext2_unlink(), ext2_rename() and ext2_rmdir(): WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 609 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 609 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline] ext2_unlink+0x26c/0x300 fs/ext2/namei.c:295 vfs_unlink+0x2fc/0x9b0 fs/namei.c:4477 do_unlinkat+0x53e/0x730 fs/namei.c:4541 __x64_sys_unlink+0xc6/0x110 fs/namei.c:4587 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 646 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 646 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline] ext2_rename+0x35e/0x850 fs/ext2/namei.c:374 vfs_rename+0xf2f/0x2060 fs/namei.c:5021 do_renameat2+0xbe2/0xd50 fs/namei.c:5178 __x64_sys_rename+0x7e/0xa0 fs/namei.c:5223 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 634 at fs/inode.c:336 drop_nlink+0xad/0xd0 fs/inode.c:336 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 634 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 6.12.77+ #1 Call Trace: <TASK> inode_dec_link_count include/linux/fs.h:2518 [inline] ext2_rmdir+0xca/0x110 fs/ext2/namei.c:311 vfs_rmdir+0x204/0x690 fs/namei.c:4348 do_rmdir+0x372/0x3e0 fs/namei.c:4407 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xf0/0x130 fs/namei.c:4577 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Extend the existing i_nlink == 0 check to also catch this case, reporting the corruption via ext2_error() and returning -EFSCORRUPTED. This rejects the inode at load time and prevents it from reaching any of the namei.c paths. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46004 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly The probe procedure of setup_card() in caiaq driver doesn't treat the error cases gracefully, e.g. the error from snd_card_register() calls snd_card_free() but continues. This would lead to a UAF for the further calls like snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(), as Berk suggested in another patch in the link below. However, the problem is not only that; in general, this function drops the all error handlings (as it's a void function) although its caller can propagate an error to snd_probe(), which eventually calls snd_card_free() as a proper error path. That said, we should treat each error case in setup_card(), and just return the error code promptly, which is then handled later as a fatal error in snd_probe(). This patch achieves it by changing the setup_card() to return an error code. Also, the superfluous snd_card_free() call is removed, too. Note that card->private_free can be set still safely at returning an error. All called functions in card_free() have checks of the unassigned resources or NULL checks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46008 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. damos_walk() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request. The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damos_walk() could race with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks. For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk() request cancelling. Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never handles the new request. As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread infinitely waits. Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely walk_control_obsolete. It is protected by the damon_ctx->walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of the remaining damos_walk() request is executed. damos_walk() reads the obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request. After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together. The issue is found by sashiko [1]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46010 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix error handling in rxgk_extract_token() Fix a missing bit of error handling in rxgk_extract_token(): in the event that rxgk_decrypt_skb() returns -ENOMEM, it should just return that rather than continuing on (for anything else, it generates an abort). | ||||
| CVE-2026-46011 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work The mtk_jpeg_release() function frees the context structure (ctx) without first cancelling any pending or running work in ctx->jpeg_work. This creates a race window where the workqueue callback may still be accessing the context memory after it has been freed. Race condition: CPU 0 (release) CPU 1 (workqueue) ---------------- ------------------ close() mtk_jpeg_release() mtk_jpegenc_worker() ctx = work->data // accessing ctx kfree(ctx) // freed! access ctx // UAF! The work is queued via queue_work() during JPEG encode/decode operations (via mtk_jpeg_device_run). If the device is closed while work is pending or running, the work handler will access freed memory. Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync() BEFORE acquiring the mutex. This ordering is critical: if cancel_work_sync() is called after mutex_lock(), and the work handler also tries to acquire the same mutex, it would cause a deadlock. Note: The open error path does NOT need cancel_work_sync() because INIT_WORK() only initializes the work structure - it does not schedule it. Work is only scheduled later during ioctl operations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46012 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response() Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all the releases skip on a NULL pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46013 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memfd_luo: fix physical address conversion in put_folios cleanup In memfd_luo_retrieve_folios()'s put_folios cleanup path: 1. kho_restore_folio() expects a phys_addr_t (physical address) but receives a raw PFN (pfolio->pfn). This causes kho_restore_page() to check the wrong physical address (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT instead of the actual physical address). 2. This loop lacks the !pfolio->pfn check that exists in the main retrieval loop and memfd_luo_discard_folios(), which could incorrectly process sparse file holes where pfn=0. Fix by converting PFN to physical address with PFN_PHYS() and adding the !pfolio->pfn check, matching the pattern used elsewhere in this file. This issue was identified by the AI review. https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260323110747.193569-1-duanchenghao@kylinos.cn | ||||
| CVE-2026-46014 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-16 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Add missing save/restore handling of LBR MSRs MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and LBR MSRs are currently not enumerated by KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, and LBR MSRs cannot be set with KVM_SET_MSRS. So save/restore is completely broken. Fix it by adding the MSRs to msrs_to_save_base, and allowing writes to LBR MSRs from userspace only (as they are read-only MSRs) if LBR virtualization is enabled. Additionally, to correctly restore L1's LBRs while L2 is running, make sure the LBRs are copied from the captured VMCB01 save area in svm_copy_vmrun_state(). Note, for VMX, this also fixes a flaw where MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR isn't reported as an MSR to save/restore. Note #2, over-reporting MSR_IA32_LASTxxx on Intel is ok, as KVM already handles unsupported reads and writes thanks to commit b5e2fec0ebc3 ("KVM: Ignore DEBUGCTL MSRs with no effect") (kvm_do_msr_access() will morph the unsupported userspace write into a nop). [sean: guard with lbrv checks, massage changelog] | ||||