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Search Results (370462 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64274 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64273 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64270 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device: packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE); if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; ... error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64267 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: avoid 32-bit prune notification count wrap FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE validates the nodeid payload length with: size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64) On 32-bit kernels, size_t is also 32 bits, so the daemon-controlled count multiplication can wrap. A prune notification with count 0x20000000 and no nodeid payload passes the check, enters the copy loop, and asks the device copy path to read nodeids that are not present in the userspace write buffer. In QEMU this reaches the fuse_copy_fill() BUG_ON(!err) path. Validate the payload length with array_size() instead. That accepts exactly the same valid messages, but avoids wrapping arithmetic before the copy loop consumes the count. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64266 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio() fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them, leading to use-after-free issues. Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64265 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt() iterates fiq->interrupts: - list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab - req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending. Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64263 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired() checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry that was moved to this list. Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock. Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops queues. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64260 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req' might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu might already do teardown work. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64259 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-25 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: make a fuse_req on SQE commit only findable after memcpy Bad userspace might try to trick us and send commit SQEs request unique / commit-id of requests that are not even send to fuse-server (io_uring_cmd_done() not called) yet. fuse_uring_commit_fetch() ends the fuse request when the ring entry has a wrong state, but that could have caused a use-after-free with the memcpy operations in fuse_uring_send_in_task(). In order to avoid such races the call of fuse_uring_add_to_pq() is moved after the copy operations and just before completing the io-uring request - malicious userspace cannot find the request anymore until all prepration work in fuse-client/kernel is completed. This also moves fuse_uring_add_to_pq() a bit up in the code to avoid a forward declaration. Also not with a preparation commit, to make it easier to back port to older kernels. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47473 | 1 Nvidia | 1 Tensorrt-llm | 2026-07-25 | 7.4 High |
| NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a write-what-where condition. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to data tampering, denial of service, and information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24234 | 1 Nvidia | 1 Tensorrt-llm | 2026-07-25 | 6.8 Medium |
| NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for Linux contains a vulnerability in the multimodal media fetching functions, where a network-accessible attacker could cause server-side request forgery. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service and information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24220 | 1 Nvidia | 1 Tensorrt-llm | 2026-07-25 | 6.4 Medium |
| NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for any platform contains a vulnerability in visual gen server, where an attacker could cause an unsafe deserialization by unauthorized zeroMQ deserialization. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24259 | 1 Nvidia | 1 Tensorrt-llm | 2026-07-25 | 6.4 Medium |
| NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause missing authentication for a critical function. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47470 | 1 Nvidia | 1 Tensorrt-llm | 2026-07-25 | 6.2 Medium |
| NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM for any platform contains a vulnerability in the gRPC server chat API endpoint, where an attacker could cause CWE-20 by local attack. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-15767 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-07-25 | 8.8 High |
| Heap buffer overflow in libyuv in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted video file. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-15771 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-07-25 | 5.3 Medium |
| Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Media in Google Chrome on Windows prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-15774 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-07-25 | 8.3 High |
| Use after free in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-15775 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-07-25 | 6.5 Medium |
| Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-15776 | 1 Google | 1 Chrome | 2026-07-25 | 8.8 High |
| Inappropriate implementation in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.125 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) | ||||
| CVE-2026-24238 | 1 Nvidia | 1 Tensorrt | 2026-07-25 | 7.8 High |
| NVIDIA TensorRT for contains a vulnerability where an attacker might cause an improper validation of array index. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution. | ||||